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1Abstract
We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals
are allowed to update upwards their contribution during a ﬁxed time interval. Experimental
evidence shows that subjects increase their contributions in order to ﬁnance the cost of the
good. The public good is ﬁnanced more frequently when its cost is low relative to the social
ability to pay.
Keywords Public Goods, Experiments, Voluntary contributions, Dynamic contributions
JEL Classiﬁcation: C92; H41
R´ esum´ e
Nous exp´ erimentons un m´ ecanisme de fourniture d’un bien public discret dans lequel
les individus peuvent r´ eviser ` a la hausse leur contribution durant une p´ eriode de temps
pr´ eﬁx´ ee. Les r´ esultats exp´ erimentaux montrent que les sujets de l’exp´ erience augmentent leur
contribution aﬁn de ﬁnancer le coˆ ut du bien public. Ce dernier est ﬁnanc´ e plus fr´ equemment
lorsque son coˆ ut est faible relativement ` a la capacit´ e sociale ` a payer.
Mots clef Biens publics, Exp´ eriences, Contributions volontaires, Contributions dy-
namiques
Codes JEL: C92; H41
2Non technical summary
According to theory, dynamic structure of contribution to a public good cannot, in itself,
lead to an eﬃcient outcome, see Fersthman and Nitzan (1991), Admati and Perry (1991),
Gradstein (1992). The reason for negative results is that the introduction of dynamics allows
individuals to free ride upon future contributions. This can be counteracted by assuming
some form of punishment for free riders. For example, Marx and Matthews (2000) assume
that individuals commit to stop contributing if some individual contributes zero in the current
period. In this paper, we introduce a ﬁxed contribution period and a discrete public good, i.e.,
there is no beneﬁt from contributing if a given total amount is not reached and individuals
cannot delay their contribution indeﬁnitely if they want to obtain some positive gain.
With regard to the experimental analysis of dynamic public goods games, the experiment
in our paper presents similarities and diﬀerences in comparison to experimental literature.
Dorsey (1992) is interested in the relationship between the production technology of a public
good and the amount collected, while we are mainly concerned with the eﬃcient provision
of a discrete public good. As in our paper, Dorsey allows the individuals to update their
contribution during a ﬁxed period. He uses linear public good production technologies which
are continuous save for the following: if a given minimum amount of total contributions is
not reached, the good is not provided at all, but the individuals are not refunded. There are
two types of possible updates: increasing or decreasing contributions. All individuals are
originally given the same amount of (experimental) money, i.e., they have identical endow-
ments, or Ability to Pay (ATP). By contrast, in our paper, we allow only increasing updates.
We have a binary production function: either the good is produced, or it is not produced at
all. Moreover, individuals have heterogeneous endowments, or ATP. The amounts of these
endowments are private information.
Other related experimental papers are Levati and Neugebauer (2004) and G¨ uth et al.
(2002). Levati and Neugebauer (2004) experiment a situation where individuals are allowed
to increase their contributions at a ﬁxed rate (English clock mechanism) and can decide to
stop contributing (i.e. exit the game) at any moment and never contribute again. They as-
sume identical ATP, which is common knowledge to all the players, and a linear production
function. G¨ uth et al. (2002) extend this framework by allowing diﬀerent ATP, which is also
common knowledge to all players, increasing/decreasing contributions and three types of
production technologies (weakest link, average contributions and best shot). To our knowl-
edge, dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good with private information on
ATP have never been examined in experimental literature.
The experimental evidence we provide shows that using a dynamic voluntary contribution
mechanism to provide a discrete public good in the presence of a provision point would
produce incentives for the individuals to increase their contribution. This behavior could be
explained by the intuition that it is in the interest of each individual to act in favor of the
3objective of providing the public good, as subjects do not make a proﬁt if the provision point
is not reached. In other words, we have a situation whereby, when acting in favor of his/her
own interest, an individual also acts in favor of society’s interest. Sharing contributions
equally when subjects are endowed with diﬀerent amounts is not always possible, according
to our results, as it depends on the level of the provision point. Finally, when given a time
interval within which increasing contributions is possible, subjects either contribute at the
beginning of the period, or wait until the end in the hope that the others will increase the
sum of contributions to the provision point.
4R´ esum´ e non technique
En th´ eorie, une structure dynamique de contributions ` a un bien public ne peut pas, en
soi, aboutir ` a un r´ esultat eﬃcace, voir Fersthman et Nitzan (1991), Admati et Perry (1991),
Gradstein (1992). La raison pour ces r´ esultats n´ egatives est le fait que l’introduction d’une
dynamique laisse la possibilit´ e aux individus de free ride-er sur les contributions futures.
De tels comportements peuvent ˆ etre contrecarr´ es par l’introduction d’une punition pour les
free riders. Par exemple, Marx et Matthews (2000) supposent que les individus s’engagent
` a arrˆ eter de contribuer si quelqu’un contribue z´ ero dans la p´ eriode courante. Dans le pr´ esent
article, nous introduisons un bien public discret et une p´ eriode de contribution pr´ eﬁx´ ee de
sorte que les contributions ne rapportent pas de b´ en´ eﬁces si un seuil donn´ e n’est pas atteint
et les individus ne peuvent pas retarder ind´ eﬁniment leur contribution s’ils veulent obtenir
un gain positif.
Concernant l’analyse exp´ erimentale des jeux dynamiques de biens publics, les exp´ eriences
de notre article pr´ esentent des similitudes et des diﬀ´ erences avec la litt´ erature exp´ erimentale.
Dorsey (1992) s’int´ eresse ` a la relation entre la fonction de production du bien public et le
montant collect´ e tendis que nous sommes int´ eress´ es principalement par la production eﬃcace
d’un bien public discret. Comme ici, Dorsey laisse la possibilit´ e aux individus de r´ eviser leurs
contributions durant une p´ eriode pr´ eﬁx´ ee. Il utilise des fonctions de production lin´ eaires qui
sont continues sauf ` a un point o` u la quantit´ e produite s’annule si le montant de contributions
est inf´ erieur ` a un seuil, les contributions ´ etant non-remboursables. Dorsey introduit deux
types de r´ evisions : hausse et baisse ; les individus sont dot´ es du mˆ eme montant de monnaie
exp´ erimentale, c’est-` a-dire ils ont des dotations ou Capacit´ e ` a Payer (CAP) identiques. En
contraste, dans notre article nous autorisons uniquement des r´ evisions ` a la hausse ; nous
utilisons une fonction de production binaire : soit un montant donn´ e de bien public est
produit, soit non. De plus, les individus ont des dotations h´ et´ erog` enes dont les montants
sont information priv´ ee.
D’autres ´ etudes exp´ erimentales proches sont Levati et Neugebauer (2004) et G¨ uth et al.
(2002). Levati et Neugebauer (2004) exp´ erimentent une situation dans laquelle les contribu-
tions croissent ` a un taux ﬁxe (m´ ecanisme English clock) et les individus peuvent arrˆ eter
de contribuer, c’est-` a-dire sortir du jeu ` a tout moment sans la possibilit´ e de revenir. Ils intro-
duisent des CAP identiques qui sont connaissance commune et une fonction de production
lin´ eaire. G¨ uth et al. (2002)´ elargissent cet environnement en introduisant des CAP diﬀ´ erentes
qui sont encore une fois connaissance commune, des contributions croissantes/d´ ecroissantes,
et trois types de fonctions de production (weakest link, moyenne des contributions et
best shot). A notre connaissance, des contributions volontaires dynamiques ` a un bien
public discret avec information priv´ ee des CAP n’ont jamais ´ et´ e examin´ ees dans la litt´ erature
exp´ erimentale.
Les r´ esultats exp´ erimentaux que nous pr´ esentons montrent que l’utilisation d’un m´ ecanisme
5de contributions volontaires dynamiques pour la production d’un bien public discret va en-
gendrer des incitations pour les individus ` a accroˆ ıtre leur contribution. Ce comportement
peut ˆ etre expliqu´ e par l’intuition selon laquelle il serait dans l’int´ erˆ et de chaque individu
d’agir en faveur de la production du bien public car les individus n’escomptent pas de gain
si le seuil de production n’est pas atteint. En d’autres termes, nous avons une situation
dans laquelle en agissant pour son propre int´ erˆ et un individu agit aussi dans l’int´ erˆ et de la
soci´ et´ e. Selon nos r´ esultats, le partage ´ egalitaire du coˆ ut de production n’est pas toujours
possible est d´ epend du niveau du seuil de production. Enﬁn, lorsqu’on laisse la possibilit´ e
aux individus d’accroˆ ıtre leurs contributions dans le temps, ils ont tendance ` a contribuer
soit au d´ ebut de la p´ eriode, soit ` a attendre la ﬁn de la p´ eriode dans l’espoir que d’autres
individus vont accroˆ ıtre entre-temps la contribution au bien public.
61 Introduction
Let us consider the following example of a real situation captured by our framework. Ph.D.
students in a research lab want to jointly buy a new workstation. In order to buy it at a
special rate they must order it before the end of the week. During the week students can at
any moment give cash towards the purchase of the machine. The director of the lab collects
the money in cash and announces the total amount collected each time he receives a new
payment. A student that has already given some amount of money can give another one at
any time. At the end of the week, if the amount collected covers the cost, the workstation
is bought. If the total amount is larger than the cost, the director can use the extra amount
as he pleases (no refund of extra contributions). If the total amount is less than the cost
(the provision point is not met) then the director spends the contributed money on his own
dinner (or party or vacation) without inviting the students to participate (assuming the
students don’t have positively or negatively altruistic feelings about the director dining on
their money). In this paper we describe an experiment for this situation.
According to theory, dynamic structure of contribution to a public good cannot, in itself,
lead to an eﬃcient outcome, see Fersthman and Nitzan (1991), Admati and Perry (1991),
Gradstein (1992). The reason for negative results is that the introduction of dynamics allows
individuals to free ride upon future contributions. This can be counteracted by assuming
some form of punishment for free riders. For example, Marx and Matthews (2000) assume
that individuals commit to stop contributing if some individual contributes zero in the current
period. In our paper, the punishment stems from the introduction of a ﬁxed contribution
period and a discrete public good, i.e., there is no beneﬁt from contributing if a given total
amount is not reached and individuals cannot delay their contribution indeﬁnitely if they
want to obtain some positive gain.
With regard to the experimental analysis of dynamic public goods games, the experiment
in our paper presents similarities and diﬀerences in comparison to experimental literature.
Dorsey (1992) is interested in the relationship between the production technology of a public
good and the amount collected, while we are mainly concerned with the eﬃcient provision
of a discrete public good. As in our paper, Dorsey allows the individuals to update their
contribution during a ﬁxed period. He uses linear public good production technologies which
are continuous save for the following: if a given minimum amount of total contributions is
not reached, the good is not provided at all, but the individuals are not refunded. There are
two types of possible updates: increasing or decreasing contributions. All individuals are
originally given the same amount of (experimental) money, i.e., they have identical endow-
ments, or Ability to Pay (ATP). By contrast, in our paper, we allow only increasing updates.
We have a binary production function: either the good is produced, or it is not produced
at all. Moreover, individuals are originally given diﬀerent amounts of (experimental) money,
7i.e., they have heterogeneous endowments, or ATP. The amounts of these endowments are
private information.
Other related experimental papers are Levati and Neugebauer (2004) and G¨ uth et al.
(2002). Levati and Neugebauer (2004) experiment a situation where individuals are allowed
to increase their contributions at a ﬁxed rate (English clock mechanism) and can decide to
stop contributing (i.e. exit the game) at any moment and never contribute again. Obviously,
this does not give them a chance to reconsider their contributions once they have decided to
stop contributing. Levati and Neugebauer (2004) assume identical ATP, which is common
knowledge to all the players, and a linear production function. G¨ uth et al. (2002) extend
this framework by allowing diﬀerent ATP, which is also common knowledge to all play-
ers, increasing/decreasing contributions and three types of production technologies (weakest
link, average contributions and best shot). Furthermore, as in our experiment, individuals
can increase/decrease their contribution by any amount. Each individual can observe the
amount contributed by the other members of the group. In contrast, in our paper, an indi-
vidual can only observe the total amount contributed, but not each individual’s contribution.
To our knowledge, dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good with private
information on ATP have never been examined in experimental literature.
2 Experimental design
The experiments are conducted using groups of four subjects (n = 4). Two of these subjects
are endowed with 100 tokens (i.e. experimental currency units) and the other two with 200
tokens. Thus, the Ability to Pay of an individual i is ATPi = {100,200}. The endowments
are private information. As in Hichri (2004), we run two treatments with diﬀerent levels
of social surplus. In the ﬁrst treatment the provision cost of the public good, c, represents
60% of the sum of the individual ATP (
P4
i=1 ATPi = 600), i.e., the provision point is 360
tokens1. .In the second treatment, the cost c represents 80% of the sum of the ATP, i.e., 480
tokens2. The time interval for contribution, T, is ﬁxed at 90 seconds.
In this experiment, individuals do not earn anything if the provision point is not reached.
When the sum of contributions of one group exceeds the provision point, each individual
earns the diﬀerence between his or her endowment ATPi and his or her contribution xi to
the public good. The payoﬀ πi of individual i is calculated as follows:
πi = d.(ATPi − xi)
1Note that in the ﬁrst treatment, equal cost sharing implies that every subject has to pay 90 tokens,
which is compatible with individual rationality, as individual endowments are higher than 90.
2In the second treatment, equal cost sharing implies that every subject has to pay 120 tokens, which is
not compatible with individual rationality, as two of the four players are endowed with only 100 tokens.
8where xi ≥ 0 is the amount given by i to the public good, and d is a dummy parameter
(d = 1 if the provision point is reached, and d = 0 if not).
We make sure while programming the experiment that individual contributions are sys-
tematically refused when they are negative. In such a case, the program sends a warning
message and asks for a positive amount. However, individuals are able to contribute an
amount that is higher than their initial endowment. In fact, we choose not to reduce con-
tributions to the amount that warrants a positive payoﬀ for individuals, as we suppose that
individuals may be willing to lose money to allow the public good to be realized. On the
other hand, this also gives us an opportunity to see whether individuals have understood the
game, as the rationality of players implies that their contributions should not exceed their
initial endowments.
The experiment was run in January 2004 at LeeX (Laboratori d’Economia Experimen-
tal), at University Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona. Each treatment included two experimental
sessions of about one hour and a quarter. In each session we set three independent groups.
This gives six independent statistical observations per treatment and requires 24 subjects
per treatment (48 subjects for the whole experiment). All of them were students selected
randomly on the campus.
Each group played one practice period, followed by 20 paying periods. At the end of
each period, each subject was informed about the number of tokens he had earned. The
number of subjects n in a group, the provision cost, c, the length of the time interval, T, and
the number of experimental periods were common knowledge. At the end of the session, a
questionnaire was distributed to subjects.
The experiment was computerized. We used z-Tree software, developed by Fischbacher
(1999). At the beginning of each session, subjects were randomly assigned a computer. The
experimenter read the instructions3 aloud. All the questions were answered publicly. During
the experiment, communication was totally forbidden. We made sure that the game was
well understood before beginning each session.
Subjects were paid privately and in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment of
a player was equal to the amount of tokens he won converted into euros at the rate of 100
tokens = 1 euro, plus 6 euros as show up fees.
3 Results
We are primarily interested on the ability of the mechanism to eﬃciently provide the public
good. A second question is: how do individuals behave during the interval of 90 seconds; in
particular do they increase their contributions? To study the eﬃciency of the mechanism,
3See the Appendix for the instructions given to individuals before the beginning of the experiment.
9we examine the total amount of contributions after 90 seconds and we construct an index,
denoted Ef, representing the ratio of the number of times a group succeeded in contributing
a suﬃcient amount to provide the public good (
P4
i=1 xi ≥ c) over the total number of
experimental periods.





















































 5  10  15  20
Group 6
Figure 1: Contribution of each group over the 20 experimental periods (low treatment)
Table 1: Eﬃciency ratio (low treatment)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Average
Ef 0.60 0.80 0.73 0.40 0.67 0.73 0.66
From Figure 1 we observe that in the ﬁrst experimental periods some subjects (groups 1,
2 and 4) contributed large amounts, higher than their ATP for instance. As we observe this
behavior only in the ﬁrst periods, we can assume that the reason for such behavior is the
fact that they did not understand the game, which excludes the idea that individuals may
be irrational and altruistic and willing to make negative proﬁts. Because their payoﬀ was
negative, they quickly learned not to contribute more than their ATP. Thus, we discounted
the ﬁrst 5 periods from the analysis of the results, considering them as learning periods. The
ratio Ef was computed over the 15 last periods.
We observe that the total amount of contributions is close to the cost of provision, even
if it is less than c in some periods or slightly more than c in other periods. When the amount
exceeded the cost of provision, we discover that this is because at the end of the period (in
10the last 3 seconds) several individuals contributed simultaneously in order to complete the




























































0s 15s 30s 45s 60s 75s 90s
Figure 2: Individual contributions during a period (low treatment)
Turning to individual behavior, Figure 2 reports the average contribution of each individ-
ual during a period, i.e., after 15, 30, 45, 60, 75 and 90 seconds. This average is calculated
over the last 15 periods. As shown in Figure 2, all subjects increased their contribution
within the time interval of 90 seconds. This behavior suggests that they had incentives to
reach the provision point. Intuitively, the only way to obtain a positive payoﬀ is to con-
tribute a total amount that is greater than c. Acting in favor of this objective requires that
subjects have to increase their individual contribution. Two main behavior patterns may be
distinguished: (1) individuals who contributed large amounts during the 15 ﬁrst seconds and
contributed only slightly thereafter; (2) individuals who contributed low amounts during the
ﬁrst 75 seconds and contributed large amounts during the last 15 seconds. There were also
individuals who followed a mixture of these two behavior patterns.
We also observed that subjects with low ATP (ATPi = 100; dashed lines) contributed
on average 69% of their ATP, while subjects with higher ATP had a relative contribution
equal to 52%. This could be explained by a tendency towards equal cost sharing observed
in groups 5 and 6 (all members contributed nearly 90 tokens regardless of their ATP), even
if some individuals were better endowed. In groups 2 and 3 this tendency was mitigated by
the behavior of one individual with low ATP who committed to low contributions.
11Table 2: Eﬃciency ratio (high treatment)
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Average
Ef 0.07 0.20 0.47 0.27 0.40 0.07 0.25
3.2 High threshold treatment (c = 480)
As an alternative interpretation of the experiment, the time interval T can be seen as a bar-
gaining period in which a cost-sharing agreement might be found. A benchmark agreement
in such a bargaining situation is to share the cost equally. As we saw in the previous section,
there is a tendency towards equal cost sharing in some groups. What will happen if equal
cost sharing is not compatible with the individual rationality of some individuals? What if
the equal sharing rule supposes that subjects must give more than their initial endowment?





















































 5  10  15  20
Group 6
Figure 3: Contribution of each group over the 20 experimental periods (high treatment)
The results can be seen in Table 2 and Figure 3. We observe that the amount of contri-
butions exceeds the provision point less frequently. On average, the public good is ﬁnanced
24.7% of the time. In other words, subjects have more diﬃculty in ﬁnding a cost-sharing
agreement. Intuitively, the reason might be that the set of agreements compatible with in-
dividual rationality is now restricted, making it harder to reach an agreement. Indeed, if
the number of agreements that can be explored by a group during a given time interval is
ﬁxed, determined by an individual’s cognitive capacities for instance, restricting the set of
possible agreements automatically means that the chances of ﬁnding an agreement during a
ﬁxed time interval are decreased.
However, we still observe that the amount of contributions is close to the provision point
















































0s 15s 30s 45s 60s 75s 90s
Figure 4: Individual contributions during a period (high treatment)
means that the incentives to ﬁnance the public good are still present. This can be recognized
from Figure 4, where we can see that subjects are increasing their contributions during the
contribution time interval. We also observe that subjects with low ATP (ATPi = 100;
dashed lines) contributed on average almost the same relative amount as subjects with high
ATP, 72% and 71% respectively. This indicates that subjects understood that equal cost
sharing was not possible, but they did not have enough time to ﬁnd a diﬀerent cost-sharing
agreement, leading to less frequent provision of the public good4. Obviously, one can test
whether the replication of these treatments with an increase of the contribution interval
would improve the eﬃciency of the mechanism. This is for future research to determine.
4 Conclusion
Experimental results have to be interpreted with great caution as they are sensitive to the
design of the protocol and provide a limited number of independent observations, which
makes general conclusions impossible. Nevertheless, the experimental evidence we provide
in this paper shows that using a dynamic voluntary contribution mechanism to provide a
discrete public good in the presence of a provision point would produce incentives for the
individuals to increase their contribution. This behavior could be explained by the intuition
4For comparison, we note that in Dorsey’s (1992) experiments the time interval was ﬁxed at 180 seconds,
i.e. twice the amount of time given in our experiment.
13that it is in the interest of each individual to act in favor of the objective of providing
the public good, as subjects do not make a proﬁt if the provision point is not reached. In
other words, we have a situation whereby, when acting in favor of his/her own interest, an
individual also acts in favor of society’s interest. Sharing contributions equally when subjects
are endowed with diﬀerent amounts is not always possible, according to our results, as it
depends on the level of the provision point. Finally, when given a time interval within which
increasing contributions is possible, subjects either contribute at the beginning of the period,
or wait until the end in the hope that the others will increase the sum of contributions to
the provision point.
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14Appendix
These instructions are translated from the Spanish instructions that were distributed to
subjects before the beginning of the experiment and correspond to one of the two treatments
we are testing (Low threshold treatment).
Instructions:
Welcome,
You will participate in an experiment that will allow you to earn money. The amount
you will win will be given to you at the end of the experiment. Independently of the game,
you already have EUR 6 that will be added to any money you win during the experiment.
As shown in the following illustration of the game, the groups in the experiment will be
randomly formed with four people per group (you and three other people). The identity of
the other three group members will not be revealed to you.
Each group will be composed of the same people during the experiment. The latter is
formed of one practice period that will not be considered when computing your gains, and
20 remunerated periods. The session will last approximately one hour and a half. Groups
are independent and do not interact with each other.
You are not allowed to communicate with anyone in the room during the session. If
you have any questions at any moment, please raise your hand and the experimenter will
answer your questions privately. Any communication will lead to your exclusion from the
room without any payment.
During each period, you have to take a decision and your payoﬀ will depend on this
decision and on those of the other members of your group. Your total gains from the session
will be the sum of your gains from the 20 periods. The aim of the experiment is to win the
maximum number of points.
At the beginning of each period, you will see the number of points you have on the
computer screen. This number is private information and may be diﬀerent from the num-
ber assigned to the other members of your group. You will have the same number at the
beginning of each period in the game (20 periods).
During each period, lasting one minute and 30 seconds, at any moment and several times
you can place a share of the points you have in an urn. The total number of points you have
put in the urn and the sum of points that the group has put in this urn will be indicated
continuously on the computer screen.
At the end of the period, if the sum of the points that all the members of the group have
put in this urn is above or equal to 360, each group member wins the remainder of points
he/she still has. If the number 360 is not reached, all group members lose all the points they
have put in the urn and all the points they still have at the end of the period.
Example:
15* Suppose that you have 150 points and that you put 100 points in the urn. If the sum
of the points that your group has put in the urn is 300 (< 360), each group member loses
all of their points.
* Suppose that you have 150 points and that you put 100 in the urn. If the sum of the
points that your group has put in the urn is 400 (≥ 360), you win 150 - 100 = 50 points.
At the end of each period, the points you win during this period will be indicated on the
computer screen.
This game will be repeated identically during all the periods of the game. At the end of
the experiment, you will be paid in cash and privately. The total number of points you will
win in the 20 periods of the experiment will be converted into euros at the rate of:
1 euro = 100 points
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